Non-technical summary 5
VII. Banks' balance sheet structure 25
VIII. Robustness 26

IX. Conclusion 27
Literature 29
Tables 31
Appendices 37
European Central Bank working paper series 42
Non-technical summary
Markets can limit the risk taking of banks, only if some market participants unambiguously have their money at stake. This implies that some liabilities of the bank must be credibly excluded from the safety net.
In this paper, we argue that explicit deposit insurance may play a useful role as a commitment device of authorities to limit the safety net to those explicitly covered under the deposit insurance. This point stands in contrast to the frequently reiterated argument that deposit insurance generates moral hazard and incentives for excessive risk taking by banks. If prior to the introduction of deposit insurance implicit guarantees were broad, the effect of introducing explicit deposit insurance on market monitoring and risk taking of banks may be positive. The reason is that all creditors of the bank aside from those insured under the explicit system may have stronger incentives to monitor the bank. Based on the empirical evidence for the European Union (EU) presented in this paper, it appears that explicit deposit insurance may in fact be a useful way to limit the safety net, increase market monitoring of banks, and reduce moral hazard.
In this paper, we first present a simple model which suggests that profit maximising banks may increase or reduce their risk taking in response to the introduction of deposit insurance, depending on four factors. One, whether or not the explicit deposit insurance is credible in excluding all other creditors of the bank. Second, the charter value of the bank. Third, the share of liabilities aside from insured deposits on the balance sheet of the bank. And fourth, whether or not the banks is too-big-to-fail. The model highlights that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, which credibly imposes limits on the safety net, will result in a reduction of risk for banks with low charter values, high shares of non-insured liabilities and for banks that are not too-big-to-fail.
The predictions of the model are tested in a sample of EU banks during the 1990s. The EU in the 1990s is a particularly suitable environment for testing the model, because a number of countries introduced explicit deposit insurance during that period. This implies that there is cross-sectional as well as time series variation in the existence of explicit deposit insurance in a sample of banks, which aside from deposit insurance operate in a largely similar regulatory environment. The empirical results are broadly consistent with the theory. In particular we find: (i) The introduction of explicit deposit insurance in the EU may have significantly reduced banks' risk taking.
(ii) This effect is stronger for banks with low charter values and high subordinated debt shares. (iii) The risk taking of banks with a very large share in the banking system of the country is unaffected ("too big to fail"). The theoretical model also predicts that banks will increase the share of insured deposits in response to the introduction of explicit deposit insurance, precisely in order to avoid increased market discipline. In deposit share regressions, we find evidence in favour of this hypothesis.
The results of the paper highlight the importance of the institutional environment for effective market discipline of banks. It also provides evidence that banks in fact change their behaviour in response to signals from the market, i.e. that market discipline can be effective. In this sense, the paper contributes to the ongoing and extensive debate about the role markets as complements (or even substitutes) for supervisory review and capital requirements, as outlined in the proposals regarding the reform of the Basel Accord.
I.
Introduction
Markets can limit the risk taking of banks, only if some market participants unambiguously have their money at stake. This implies that some liabilities of the bank must be credibly excluded from the safety net. In this paper, we argue that explicit deposit insurance may play a useful role as a commitment device of authorities to limit the safety net to those explicitly covered under the deposit insurance. This point stands in contrast to the frequently reiterated argument that deposit insurance generates moral hazard and incentives for excessive risk taking by banks. If prior to the introduction of deposit insurance implicit guarantees were broad, the effect of introducing explicit deposit insurance on market monitoring and risk taking of banks may be positive. 2 Based on the empirical evidence for the European Union (EU) presented in this paper, it appears that explicit deposit insurance may in fact be a useful way to limit the safety net, increase market monitoring of banks, and reduce moral hazard.
Previous empirical evidence concerning the impact of deposit insurance on bank risk taking and the potential for banking sector fragility is mixed. For example, Wheelock and Wilson [1994] and Alston et al. [1994] fail to establish a relationship between historical US bank failure rates and deposit insurance. In addition, Karels and McClatchey [1999] fail to find evidence that the adoption of deposit insurance increased the risk taking of US credit unions. Conversely, Grossman [1992] , Wheelok [1992] and Thies and
Gerlowski [1989] find a positive and significant relationship. Similarly, 'HPLUJ o.XQW
and Detragiache [2002] in a sample of 61 countries find that over a period from 1980-97 deposit insurance significantly increased the probability of a banking crisis in the country.
The impact of deposit insurance on risk taking interacts with at least three other important factors: banks' charter values, the effectiveness of monitoring by non-deposit creditors and "too-big-to-fail." The failure to accurately reflect any one of these factors may account for the mixed findings of the empirical literature. If banks are able to earn rents, either through regulatory limits on competition (e.g. Keeley [1990] ) or valuable lending relations (Sharpe [1990] and Rajan [1992] ) or the acquisition of reputation (e.g.
Boot and Greenbaum [1992] ), the effects of deposit insurance on risk taking may be mitigated. Similarly, the degree of risk taking of banks may be influenced by the amount of uninsured debt banks carry on their balance sheets (Dewatripont and Tirole [1993a] )
and Calomiris [1999] ). And third, if banks are perceived as "too-big-to-fail," their risk taking might not be affected by the deposit insurance arrangement, as they enjoy a comprehensive safety net in any case.
This paper aims to extend the empirical literature in two main ways. First, the existing empirical evidence regarding banks' risk taking tends to use U.S. data or use rather heterogeneous samples containing developing and developed countries, whose banking systems may be at widely different stages of liberalisation and sophistication.
There is limited evidence for developed countries, concerning the impact of deposit insurance arrangements on risk taking in an environment of competitive banking outside the US. This paper attempts to fill part of this void. Second, our data set allows us to test a rich set of hypotheses regarding the interaction between deposit insurance, charter values, monitoring, "too-big-to-fail" and moral hazard, closing some of the gap between the theoretical and empirical literatures.
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: (i) We find evidence that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance in the EU may have significantly reduced banks' risk taking.
(ii) We find that this effect is less prevalent for banks with high charter values and low subordinated debt shares. (iii) We further find that the risk taking of banks with a very large share in the banking system is unaffected ("too big to fail"). (iv) We find some adjustments in the balance sheet structure of banks towards more insured deposits after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II we motivate our empirical hypotheses by drawing on a simple model of banks with moral hazard. In Section III, we provide some institutional background of deposit insurance and deregulation in the EU. In Section IV we describe the data set we employ, along with some summary statistics. Variable definitions, the empirical specification and baseline results are reported in Sections V and VI, respectively. In Section VII, we examine the effects of the introduction of explicit deposit insurance on banks' balance sheets. Section VIII examines the robustness of our results and Section IX concludes the paper.
II. A stylised model of the safety net and moral hazard
The theoretical literature (e.g. Freixas and Rochet [1997] , Boot and Greenbaum [1993] , Dewatripont and Tirole [1993a, 1993b] and Matutes and Vives [1995] ) is unambiguous in that the public safety net, providing assistance to banks in distress and protecting banks' claim-holders from losses, increases the propensity by bank managers to take on excessive risk (moral hazard). 3 This is so, since insured claim-holders of the bank do not have appropriate incentives to monitor the actions by banks' management. In this section, we present a simple model of banks, which permits a derivation of conditions under which the introduction of explicit deposit insurance results in an increase in market monitoring if compared with an implicit bank safety net. The model also allows us to state a number of empirical hypotheses regarding the interaction of specific bank characteristics and risk taking under different safety net arrangements. As we will see below, the model relies heavily on the idea that banks' risk taking may largely be a function of the presence of a set of creditors, which are credibly excluded from the safety net.
Consider the following simple, one period banking model with I risk neutral banks denoted by subscript i. The banks are financed with deposits and subordinated debt. As in Boot and Greenbaum [1993] , the probability structure of bank i's pay-off from its loan portfolio is with certainty and will never default. Monitoring, however, is costly and we assume a strictly positive and convex monitoring cost schedule V(m) with V'(m)>0, V''(m)>0, and V(m=0)=0. 3 The safety net, defined as the protection of banks' creditors against losses resulting from bank failures, is motivated in the first place by the short maturity structure of bank liabilities and the private information characteristic of their longer-maturity assets, reflecting banks' unique liquidity creation and intermediation functions (Diamond and Dybvig [1983] , Gorton and Pennacchi [1990] and Calomiris and Kahn [1991] ) 4 For simplicity we assume that banks do not have any equity. This assumption is relaxed subsequently in the discussion on charter values. 5 The position of the business cycle of the economy a bank operates in would be one way to interpret the exogenous riskiness of the portfolio or riskiness of the sector that the bank primarily lends to.
The bank operates for a succession of equivalent periods until it fails, where failure is defined as the case of a pay-off to the loan portfolio of zero. 
Hence, if the bank does not monitor and the probability of a bail out is zero, the borrowing rate will be equal to the lending rate. Further, expression (3) shows that if either there is complete monitoring or the probability of a bail out is 1, r B will converge to the risk free rate, as in that case the bank's portfolio entails zero risk.
Equivalently, for the rate on deposits we have
Hence, the interest rate on subordinated debt and deposits is the same, as long as they are bailed out with the same probability. Once this probability differs, the bank will pay different interest rates on the two types of liabilities. While we do not model the preferences of investors explicitly, equations (3) and (4) suggest that they are risk-averse. and substituting expressions (3) and (4), we obtain the optimal level of monitoring (7) [ ]
From (7) we see that the optimal level of monitoring is an increasing function of bank i's portfolio riskiness, i and the interest rate spread between risky loans and the risk free rate. If the portfolio is riskier and the relative pay-off to risk greater, the bank will monitor more. In contrast, higher probabilities of bail out for either deposits or subordinated debt will reduce the bank's level of monitoring. Note also, that in case deposits and subordinated debt are bailed out by the government with different probabilities, the proportion of the bank that is financed with subordinated debt will matter. For the moment, we assume that i 's are fixed, but we will return to this issue below. In the following we analyse a number of specific cases.
"Free banking"
If there is no chance of a bail out or any implicit or explicit deposit insurance, we have D = B =0. The first thing to notice is that in this case the share of deposits in the liabilities of the bank, i , does not matter, as both bank liabilities are equally risky. Hence, the optimal level of monitoring becomes
Note that even in the "free banking" case the bank will not necessarily fully monitor and reduce the probability of failure to zero. We can now calculate the default probability of bank i, p i , by substituting equation (8) 
As one would expect, this probability is independent of the government's actions. The probability of a bank's failure is simply a function of the riskiness of its portfolio and the pay-off to monitoring, as represented by the interest rate spread. We allow for non-zero B to permit deposit insurance systems that credibly limit coverage to depositors as well as deposit insurance systems, which are not credible in their limitation to depositors, i.e. subordinated debt holders could be also bailed out with some non-zero probability. In the following we refer to a system with a zero bail out probability for subordinated debt holders as "credible deposit insurance." The optimal level of monitoring of a bank operating in a non-credible system becomes
Comparing (10) to (8) it is clear that for non-zero levels of deposits or a non-zero probability of a bail out of subordinated debt holders, the optimal level of monitoring with explicit deposit insurance will be less than in the "free banking case." This is also reflected in a higher probability of bank failure (12) [ ]
in case the system is not credible and
if it is credible. The default probability is strictly increasing with the likelihood that subordinated debt holders are also compensated in case of a bank failure. More interestingly, for 1 << B γ , equations (12) and (13) show that the probability of bank failure is also strictly increasing with the share of deposits in bank liabilities.
Implicit safety net
Now turn to the case with an implicit safety net. We define an implicit safety net as an arrangement in which all creditors of a bank are bailed out in the case the bank fails with some probability case of an implicit safety net, the bank's optimal level of monitoring is just equation (8), which we restate here
The optimal level of monitoring depends on the probability of bail out of both deposits and subordinated debt, as well as their relative shares in the bank's liabilities.
Using equations (11) and (7a) we can ascertain the relative level of moral hazard under the implicit safety net versus an explicit, credible deposit insurance system. We obtain the following proposition: Proposition 1. For given levels of riskiness, and a given associated risk premium, r L -r, the level of monitoring under the implicit safety net is less than that under a credible explicit deposit insurance iff Proposition 1 states that moral hazard and the likelihood of a banking crisis is reduced with the introduction of credible explicit deposit insurance relative to an implicit safety net, if the share of subordinated debt (the share of insured deposits) in bank liabilities is relatively high (low). Alternatively, if the probabilities for a bail out of deposits and subordinated debt are high under the implicit system. Proposition 1 also implies that the effect on moral hazard of the introduction of explicit deposit insurance in a country which had been characterised by widespread implicit guarantees is ambiguous ex ante. It depends upon whether the limit of the safety net to depositors is indeed credible, the share of subordinated debt on banks' balance sheets and the prevalence of implicit guarantees prior to the introduction. Hence, the introduction of deposit insurance does not necessarily increase moral hazard.
We can now state the probability of default, p tIS , under an implicit safety net system
In case of the implicit safety net, an increase in the probability of depositor or subordinated debt holder compensation (i.e. higher Corollary 1. For given levels of riskiness, and a given associated risk premium, r L -r, the probability of bank failure is higher under an implicit system than under credible deposit insurance iff
which is exactly the same condition as for proposition 1 and follows directly.
Corollary 1 states that under the condition that the limitation of the safety net to depositors is in fact credible, a bank with a higher subordinated debt share should adjust its risk taking more than a bank with a low subordinated debt share.
Charter values, "too big to fail" and balance sheet structure
We will now consider the effect of the existence of charter values for banks' risk taking under the different safety net arrangements. For that we modify the banks pay-off structure as follows (16) 0-C i with a probability i (1-m i ) and (17) r t L +C i with a probability (1-i ) + m i i .
C i represents a charter value, which should be interpreted as a fixed value of staying in operation, arising from market power, reputation or other factors. We assume that 0<C i <1. The bank will loose C i if its loan portfolio defaults and retains this value if it succeeds. 7 With this modification, the bank's maximisation problem becomes
Taking first order conditions and re-arranging yields the optimal level of monitoring with charter values
Comparing equation (8) There are many other ways to model the presence of charter values. Generally, they require multi-period models. To maintain simplicity, we have abstracted from these issues, as the question of how a charter value may arise is not the focus of this paper. For more discussion, see Boot and Greenbaum [1993 Proposition 2. For given levels of riskiness, a given associated risk premium, r L -r, and given the safety net arrangements, the level of monitoring will be higher in the presence of charter values.
Corollary 2. Given some non-zero level of subordinated debt ( i <1), banks with high charter values will adjust their monitoring (and risk taking) less than banks with low charter values in response to a shift from an implicit safety net to explicit deposit insurance. Proposition 4 has an important empirical implication: If a country moves from an implicit system, in which the probability of bail out for subordinated debt and deposits was equal 8 *LYHQ i all previous propositions and corollaries hold. or greater, to an explicit system in which the probability of depositor compensation is 1, banks will adjust their balance sheet structures towards relying more heavily on insured deposits.
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In summary, the model in this section shows that the effect of introducing explicit deposit insurance on banks risk taking may be ambiguous ex ante and depends on assumptions about the counterfactual to deposit insurance (no safety net vs. an implicit safety net). The model yields a number of empirical predictions regarding moral hazard and risk taking of banks. In Sections VII and VIII, we use a data set of European banks to test for Propositions 1 and 2 as well as Corollaries 1 and 2, and for Propositions 3 and 4.
III. Institutional background
As we propose to test the model using European data, it may be useful to give some background information on the regulatory environment in Europe. Banking deregulation in Europe began in the late 1970s and continued through the early 1990s, with significant differences in the timing and speed of the process across countries (Canals [1993] 
IV. Data sources and description
The data used in this study were obtained from a number of different sources. The resulting sample contains data for banks in all 15 EU countries ( Table 1) . The composition by country broadly corresponds to market size with the exception of the UK and Sweden, for which market values for banks were difficult to obtain in Datastream. Table 2 gives some descriptive summary statistics for the banks in the sample. The banks are relatively large, the average total assets is $48 billion. The banks, hence, are approximately seven times the average size of all EU banks in the Bankscope. We attribute this size difference to our requirement that the banks be traded at a stock exchange. The sample banks represent approximately one sixth of the total assets of the EU banking sector.
The banks in our sample quite accurately reflect the some of the stylised facts in European banking. For example, while the overall mean of the share of non-interest earnings in total earnings is 32.5 percent, this share has continuously increased from 27 percent in 1992 to 38 percent in 1998. Interestingly this is not reflected in the share of loans in total assets, which has remained approximately constant around the overall sample mean of 55 percent.
V. Definitions of dependent and independent variables
We are particularly interested in the effect of deposit insurance on bank behaviour.
Given the cross-sectional and time series variation in deposit insurance in EU countries we are able to explicitly control for the effect of the existence of deposit insurance. We create an indicator variable, which is equal to one when no system is in place, which was the case in Greece, Portugal until 1995, for Sweden until 1996 and for Finland for the entire sample period. We also created an indicator capturing differences in deposit insurance coverage. and France, which had coverage levels of 6 to 12 times the sample average, respectively
and Germany, where the coverage is limited only by the book value of capital of the bank). Details on the coverage of EU deposit insurance schemes, as well as other details are given in Appendix I. Finally, in order to measure the impact of deregulation, we created an indicator, which reflects the implementation date of the Community legislation through the 2 nd Banking Co-ordination Directive. The indicator equals one after the actual implementation date and implies that we model the liberalisation based on the Directive as a structural shift.
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A bank's charter value can be defined as the present value of the stream of profits that it expects to earn when staying in business. Hence, the charter value would equal to the market value (present value of the future expected earnings/dividend) of its assets minus the replacement cost of the bank, i.e. the expense of rebuilding the existing bank from scratch (Demsetz et. al. [1996] ). The market value is set to equal the market value of equity (E) (stock price times the amount of equities outstanding) plus the book value of banks' liabilities (L). This is reasonable, since the value of going concern would be reflected in the market value of the equity, as the equity holders would be the beneficiaries, not the debt holders. The replacement cost of a bank is simply the book value of its assets (A). Hence, the charter value (CV), which is divided by the book value of assets in order to obtain a scale-free measure, can be expressed as:
Adding 1 and simplifying gives Tobin's q, which in the following will be used as a proxy for a bank's charter value:
This measure is also used by Keeley [1990] and Demsetz et. al. [1996] . For a bank with pricing power in loan, deposit or other markets, the market value of assets (E+L) would exceed their book value (A), and q would exceed one. In equilibrium q would exactly equal one for an uninsured bank with no pricing power.
The measure q as a proxy for charter value has the advantage of permitting comparability across different bank sizes. Furthermore, it directly reflects the extent of monopoly rents earned by banks due to pricing power. Smirlock [1984] because q relates the market value of banks' assets to their current cost, it is an ideal "allin" measure of the rents. Any pricing power, irrespective of its source, would be reflected in the market value of banks' equity, and thus assets, but not in the cost of acquired assets.
This circumvents also the significant measurement problems in trying to proxy the extent of pricing power through interest rates charged by banks for loans and deposits, and even more so through accounting-based measures of margins which can be driven by many auxiliary factors and accounting peculiarities.
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In the regression analysis we also utilise balance sheet ratios to control for bank specific differences, including the share of deposits in total liabilities, the share of noninterest earnings in total earnings, and the share of loans in total assets. The share of noninterest income in total income was included to measure the bank's willingness and ability to diversify into non-lending, non-traditional activities, such as underwriting and to some extent will also proxy for the bank's "innovation ability." In the relationship between moral hazard and deposit insurance the monitoring of uninsured debt-holders may be quite important, as discussed in Section II. Therefore, we included the share of subordinated debt in total liabilities as an independent variable. In the European context, with significant differences in the size of countries' economies, we use the share of the bank's total assets in the total assets of the country's banking system to control for the "too-bigto-fail" effects on charter value and risk taking.
Further, we include a normalised country specific stock market index 15 , money market rates and a measure of the steepness of the yield curve, which we defined as the difference between money market rates and 10-year government bond yields. Finally, not all banks in the sample were commercial banks. We also had a limited number of cooperative banks and mortgage banks, which might experience valuations that are quite different from those of commercial banks. Specialised banks or banks with a somewhat different organisational form might face different constraints, as well as pursue different objectives relative to commercial banks. 16 For definitions of all variables see Appendix II.
14 A problem may arise in using q as a measure of banks' rents (or charter value), as the book value of assets reflects historical costs, rather than current costs of the assets. Therefore, ex post q may diverge from 1 simply because asset return realisations may have been different from expectations, rather than as a reflection of market power. Hence, the theoretically correct ex ante q is measured with error when using the ex post q. One could also argue that q and risk taking may be simultaneously determined. This would suggest an instrumental variable approach. We experimented with a number of instruments, but were unable to find one with an economic justification. 15 The respective stock market indices were normalised, such that for all countries 1991=100. This will ensure comparability across countries. 16 With few exceptions, our choice of control variables corresponds closely to those of Keeley [1990] . 
VI.
Econometric model and baseline results
We estimate the following reduced form model:
where risk jt represents a measure of riskiness for bank j at time t, D it represents a set of indicator variables describing the deposit insurance system and the degree of deregulation in country i at time t, X jt represent a set of control variables unique to bank j at time t, and C it are country specific control variables. Equation (23) is estimated using country-specific fixed effects in order to control for country specific differences, which are unaccounted for in the control variables. These country specific effects pick up any other policy differences across countries, which are not included explicitly in the set of control variables (such as taxes and any remaining differences in national banking regulations). The different measures of bank risk are discussed below.
In line with the theoretical literature (e.g. Matutes and Vives [1995] ), we distinguish between the three different types of risk: leverage risk, asset risk and overall bank risk.
Leverage risk is defined as the book value of debt divided by the market value of assets (the market value of equity plus the book value of liabilities). It measures the degree of gearing of the bank; the more highly geared a bank is, the riskier it, as its cushion against an unexpected deterioration in the quality of its assets is smaller than in a less leveraged bank. Higher gearing may also reflect a readjustment in the balance structure towards deposits (Proposition 4). Our second measure of risk, asset risk, is approximated by using the share of problem loans in total assets. Finally, we use the inter-day volatility of the bank's share price, corrected for the market component as a measure of the overall risk of the bank. We defined the volatility as
for any year t and bank j, where p d represents the stock price on day d, n represents the number of trading days and Sd is the standard deviation of the daily stock price during period t. From (24) we extracted the non-diversifiable component. This was done, as we were concerned that our measure of overall risk may be driven by the volatility of the market portfolio rather than by non-diversified risk. Hence, we estimated a standard market model and calculated the standard deviation of the residuals, which gives us a measure of idiosyncratic volatility. For the details of the calculation see Appendix III.
All three measures suffer from shortcomings. In particular, our measure of leverage would benefit from a market-based measure of liabilities, which we did not have access to.
The measure of asset risk is backward looking, not a measure of current risk, as default or payment difficulties of the clients of a bank will only appear in our measure with a lag. remain current on the initial credit. And third, differences in inter-day volatility may not only reflect the riskiness of a bank, but also the liquidity depth of the market for its shares, although we would consider this problem to be relatively small given the size of the banks in our sample.
The baseline estimates for the relationship between risk and deposit insurance are presented in Table 3 . Table 3 shows that banks tend to reduce their risk taking for two of the three measures of risk in response to the introduction of explicit deposit insurance.
Conflicting evidence is provided by the third measure: Leverage risk tends to increase with explicit deposit insurance. This is weak evidence in favour of Proposition 4; namely that banks increase their share of insured deposits when explicit deposit insurance is introduced. In the next section, we will present evidence, which more directly addresses this issue. For asset risk and overall risk, the absence of explicit deposit insurance is associated with significantly higher risk taking.
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The effects of the 2 nd Banking Directive on risk taking appear to have been mixed.
We find a weakly positive effect on leverage and asset risk. Overall risk, as measured by the idiosyncratic stock price volatility, is lower after the implementation of the directive, which we interpret to reflect the tighter solvency standards associated with the directive. Now turn to the effect of changes in the charter value (q) on risk taking. As argued in the literature, banks with higher charter values tend to exhibit lower levels of leverage and overall risk (Proposition 2).
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The estimates for the control variables largely conform to expectations. For example, banks with a higher proportion of loans in their portfolios have also a higher proportion of problem loans and, hence, more asset risk, but generally are not riskier overall. Banks with a higher share in the total assets of the banking system in their country are more highly leveraged, but also not riskier overall. This suggests that these banks may be better diversified and, hence, hold less capital. We find some evidence that subordinated debt holders are able to exert influence on the risk taking of banks (corollary 1). The coefficient has the expected significantly negative sign for overall risk.
Interestingly, it is positive for leverage risk, suggesting some substitution of tier 1 (equity) and tier 2 (subordinated debt) capital. We provide further evidence on the question of subordinated debt holder monitoring below. 17 Higher coverage is not associated with an effect on banks' risk, which is consistent with our argument that what matters is not the characteristics of the scheme, but rather its existence in the sense of leaving some creditors of the bank uncovered altogether.
18 This is consistent with the previous empirical literature using US data (e.g. Keeley Ex ante, we had no strong priors on the effects of market conditions on risk taking.
A high stock market may suggest a favourable economic environment and, hence, would be associated with lower risk of banks' portfolios. This is reflected in the significantly negative coefficient of the stock market index on asset risk. However, we also find that leverage and stock price volatility increase when stock markets are high. Similar arguments apply to the effects of interest rates.
While we have taken care to use a number of different measures of bank risk and found sensible results across all measures, we were concerned that the results may tell us little about the effect of deposit insurance, but rather highlight differences in countries unrelated to deposit insurance. Recall that the group of countries without deposit insurance includes Finland (throughout the sample period), Greece, Portugal (until 1995) and Sweden (until 1996) . We considered the possibility that coefficient on the dummy on the absence of explicit deposit insurance simply measures that these countries are different from the remainder of the sample for reasons completely unrelated to deposit insurance.
For example, both Finland and Sweden experienced banking crises at the beginning of our sample period; it is possible that this may be driving our results. 19 Regarding Greece and Portugal, we were concerned that our results could reflect the fact that the banking sector in these countries may have been less developed or otherwise dissimilar from the "core" EU countries. The country differences might also reflect differences in intensity of bank regulation and supervision, which are unrelated to deposit insurance and the country effects are too crude a measure to pick up these differences.
In order to address these concerns, we have taken two complementary approaches.
One, we interact the deposit insurance indicator with bank specific characteristics, such that the effects of deposit insurance are identified using bank characteristics, rather than country characteristics. And second, we limit our sample to the countries that at some point did not have explicit deposit insurance (Finland, Sweden, Portugal and Greece) and estimate the effects of the introduction of explicit deposit insurance relying largely on time series evidence. 19 Note, however, that we could argue that it may not be a coincidence that banking crises occurred in two countries without deposit insurance. This is the opposite point of the one in Demirgüç-Kunt 
Identification using bank characteristics
First consider the following indicators, which we interact with the "no deposit insurance" indicator:
• A set of indicators, which distinguish between banks with subordinated debt shares above and below the median of the distribution, which permits us to test for Corollary 1. The share of subordinated debt is used as a proxy for uninsured debt more generally, as we were able to measure it more accurately than the other debt categories.
• A set of indicators, which distinguishes between banks with high charter values
(charter values greater than 1) and other banks. This would allow testing for Corollary 2.
• A set of indicators, which distinguish banks, based on their relative size in the banking system. We set the cut-off point at banks with more than 12 percent of the total assets of a banking system in their country of incorporation, which represents the 90 th percentile of the distribution. The failure of banks with such a high share in the total assets of the banking system would clearly represent a systemic risk to the banking system as a whole. Hence, this distinction allows us to test Proposition 3. deterrence against additional risk taking (albeit not against higher leverage), regardless of the safety net arrangements in place.
Finally, we also find support for Proposition 3, namely, that banks, which constitute a particularly large share of the banking system in a given country, do not adjust their risk taking. The coefficients are statistically significantly different at the five-percent level for overall risk. We interpret this finding as evidence that "too big to fail" has remained a relevant issue before and after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance and further that the limit of the safety net to depositors is only credible for smaller banks.
These findings deserve some further discussion. They suggest that the regime prior to the introduction of deposit insurance was not characterised by the absence of any safety net, but the presence of a broad and implicit one. In this case, the establishment of explicit deposit insurance limits the scope of the safety net and reduces moral hazard, since, first, tended to have three percent (two percent) less problem loans on their books compared to under the no-deposit insurance case. Similarly, the idiosyncratic stock price volatility is 20 percent (25 percent) lower. For banks, which we do not classify as "too big to fail", we also find that stock price volatility is 25 percent lower after the introduction of deposit insurance compared to before.
Identification using time series variation
Recall that we have both cross sectional as well as time series variation in the existence of deposit insurance. Hence, we can limit our sample to those countries that at some point during the sample did not have explicit deposit insurance. In this case the effects of explicit deposit insurance would be identified largely through time series effects, reducing concerns that the results are driven by other cross-sectional differences 21 If a reform establishing an explicit deposit insurance scheme coincides with improvements in supervision or more stringent disclosure requirements (heightened market discipline), the reduction in risk taking could be attributed to these factors rather than the limitation of the safety net. However, developments in supervision and market disclosure have not been in Europe directly related to the changes in the deposit insurance arrangements. across countries unaccounted for by the control variables. The results for this exercise are presented in Table 5 . We limit ourselves to present results for the preferred measure of risk, overall risk. Notice that this reduces the sample size to 56 observations. Even so, we find consistent evidence that the introduction of deposit insurance has reduced risk taking by banks. Further, when interacted with bank characteristics, our main findings go through. Banks with higher subordinated debt shares and that are not "too-big-to-fail" adjust their risk taking more than other banks, in line with the predictions of the theoretical model (Propositions 1 and 3) . The evidence on charter values is weaker, however.
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VII. Banks' balance sheet structure
While the above evidence is suggestive that the effect on risk taking is somewhat mitigated by banks' move towards more insured liabilities (given the increase in leverage subsequent to the introduction of explicit deposit insurance), we would like to examine Proposition 4 and estimate (insured) deposit share equations. Hence we estimate
where IDS jt represents the share of insured deposits in bank j's liabilities in period t. All other symbols are defined as before. Given that we are estimating a quantity equation, we need proxies for the own price (i.e. the price of deposits) and the price of substitutes. As we do not have access to bank specific interest rates, we use the money market rate as the price of deposits and the bond yield as the price of a substitute. Deposit rates tend to follow short-term money market rates as they are often priced at a margin below banks' prime rates (which follow the money market rates with some lag). The bond yield can be used as a proxy of the return on alternative investments by household investors, which in the EU consist of bonds to a large extent. Further, the share of insured deposits is not directly observable. We use the share of total deposits minus the share of interbank deposits, as in all EU deposit insurance schemes they are excluded from coverage.
However, in most cases foreign currency deposits are also excluded and all schemes have a ceiling (except Germany) per depositor. Unfortunately, we do not have information on foreign currency deposits and due to the ceiling our measure of insured deposits will overstate their true share. These caveats should be kept in mind when considering the results from estimating equation (25).
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The results, presented in Table 6 , suggest that indeed banks may have shifted their liabilities towards more insured deposits in response to introducing explicit deposit 22 There are also important issues in relation to the identification of loan demand and supply, which we leave unresolved here. Equation (26) insurance. The coefficient on the absence of deposit insurance is negative and significant in the full sample, as well as when we limit the sample to those countries, which at some point did not have explicit deposit insurance. The finding is even more striking as insured deposits are measured with some error here and underlines the finding earlier that even given this shift, risk taking diminished with explicit deposit insurance. One might ask why didn't banks shift their liability structure entirely towards insured deposits. There are a number of answers to this question, which lies outside the scope of this paper, but most straightforwardly, insured deposits may be in limited supply, given that explicit deposit insurance schemes typically only insure a fixed amount per depositor. In addition, interest rates on insured deposits, which we only capture in a rudimentary way here, may adjust, offsetting the advantage due to insurance.
The other coefficients conform to expectations. The coefficients on the money market rate (which serves as the proxy for the own interest rate) is positive and highly significant, suggesting that supply effects dominate. Consistent with this finding, the rate on the alternatives, bonds and the stockmarket, show a negative effect on the share of deposits. Further, banks with higher loan shares in their assets also have higher deposit shares in their liabilities, larger banks tend to finance themselves less with deposits and, finally, specialised lending institutions and mortgage banks have lower shares of deposits than commercial banks (the omitted category).
VIII. Robustness
We performed a number of additional robustness checks. One, charter values (q) and risk taking of banks may be simultaneously determined (see e.g. Keeley [1990] ).
However, we were unable to obtain an instrument with an economic justification for why it was related to charter values and orthogonal to risk. Hence, we experimented with models identified through country specific effects and used q lagged by one period. The results are reported in Appendix IV.1 and suggest that there may be some simultaneity problems in relation to leverage risk. Recall that q is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value and we measure leverage ratio by calculating the debt equity ratio as the book value of debt divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. The market value of equity enters both definitions (once in the numerator and once in the denominator) and consequently market movements may spuriously generate a high negative correlation. Using country specific effects to identify the instrumental Second, we considered the possibility that a more sophisticated error structure may be more appropriate in our measure of overall risk, for example to allow for persistence in stock price volatilities. We experimented with an autocorrelated error structure of up to 6 lags and also estimated generalised linear models with stationary, unstructured and nonstationary correlation matrices. All specifications yielded quite consistent results and are available from the authors upon request.
Third, we report results from OLS regression using bank averages in Table 7 . We calculated variable averages for each bank and fitted an OLS model to this data. The objective is to address potential mismeasurement through mergers or acquisitions during the sample period. The approach minimises not the overall squared differences, but the cross-sectional squared differences. We limit ourselves to reporting results for our preferred measure of risk, overall risk. Note that the sample sizes are reduced to 73 (the number of banks for which we were able to calculate overall risk). We find consistent results, suggesting that our results are unlikely to be significantly affected by distortions due to mergers.
IX. Conclusion
This paper analysed the relationship between deposit insurance, bank charter values, debt-holder monitoring, and risk taking for European banks. Utilising crosssectional and time series variation in the existence of deposit insurance schemes in the EU, we find that the establishment of explicit deposit insurance may significantly reduce the risk taking of banks. We draw two conclusions from this finding. One, in the absence of deposit insurance, European banking systems may have been characterised by strong implicit insurance operating through the expectation of public intervention at times of distress. And second, the introduction of an explicit deposit insurance system may imply a de facto reduction in the scope of the safety net and enable authorities to credibly exclude some creditors of the bank from the safety net. Our findings generally support the idea that explicit safety net arrangements are more "incentive-compatible" than the implicit ones, representing a vague but ex ante unlimited commitments by the government to intervene and protect banks' claim-holders. The government may not be able to eliminate the safety net altogether and credibly commit not to intervene under times of distress. We find this despite some tendency of banks to increase their financing with insured deposits, when explicit deposit insurance is introduced.
We have stressed in our analysis that the limit to the safety net has to be credible for deposit insurance to have a "beneficial" effect. The credibility of the system may hold the key to reconciling the evidence presented in this paper with some of the evidence in the previous literature, which tended to find that deposit insurance increases moral hazard. The evidence should also be viewed as supportive of the notion that creditors are able not only to effectively monitor banks, but also to impose discipline on at least some banks. However, the results also point to the fact that market monitoring may be inadequate for large, systemically important banks as their creditors (this includes subordinated debt holders) expect that authorities will not let those banks fail in any event ("too big to fail"). 23 Some evidence of functioning equity and debt markets is given in Gropp et al. [2002] All models were estimated using fixed effects across countries. Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The dependent variable is the inter-day volatility of the bank's stock price corrected for market volatility. The interaction terms are defined as before. where R it denotes the log daily stock return of bank j during year t and R ct represents the log daily return of the market portfolio in country i during year t. Hence, we estimate the model with about 250 daily observations for each bank in each year. 25 The residuals of this regression are commonly referred to as "abnormal" returns in the event study
literature (e.g. MacKinlay [1997] ) and would be represented by
where jt αˆ and jt βˆ are the estimated coefficients from equation (A1). If we take the standard deviation of both sides of (A2) we obtain 24 See MacKinlay [1997] for further discussion on estimating such models, as well as their relative advantages and disadvantages relative to other methods. 25 As the model was estimated with daily data, it is likely that the normality assumption is violated at least in some cases and OLS estimation (which is what we use) may not be entirely appropriate. However, as Cable and Holland [2000] show, robust estimation will not necessarily solve the problem. At present, to our knowledge, there does not exist a solution to this issue. 
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